North Korea's Missile Program and US Nonproliferation Strategy

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Abstract

Even though it is said that North Korea's missile development is a self-defense measure against US invasion tactics, its sovereign right, and that it provides powerful diplomatic and political leverage, no doubt the North's short and medium-range missiles are a growing threat. It should be clear that another long-range missile launch would have serious consequences for regional security and return the peninsula to a state of high tension.

Furthermore, Pyongyang's exports including ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, technical expertise, and complete systems to a variety of Third World countries in the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa bring about missile proliferation, and the possibility of falling into the terrorist hands.

North Korea will not easily give up its missile program because it is absolutely necessary for obtaining hard currency, which props up the socialist regime, and increases its defense capabilities.

It is suggested that both sides continue the talks with patience. Brinkmanship strategy will help neither side. A comprehensive package deal might be a solution, but if that is not possible then perhaps the North could give up development of long-range missiles and halt missile export, withdrawing missile deployment rearward. In return the US would remove the DPRK from its terrorism list and ease economic sanctions. North Korean satellites could be launched by a third country.
This article concerns North Korea's missile program and US non-proliferation strategy. It describes the missile threat including development, test-firing, and sales of missile technology and parts, looking not only at the phenomenon of the spread of WMDs and missiles, but also the substantial missile threat from North Korea. It then outlines the missile negotiations between US and DPRK, and looks at US nonproliferation policy and strategy and suggests some possible compromises.

North Korea's short- and medium-range missiles pose a serious and growing threat to South Koreans and the US forces and families on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, North Korean exports of ballistic missile-related equipment, components, materials, technical expertise, and complete systems to developing countries in the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa create missile proliferation, and the possibility that they could fall into terrorist hands.

Much difficulty can be expected in US-DPRK negotiations. North Korea needs its missile program to build up its military capabilities and generate foreign exchange, which serves as a major element for maintaining the socialist regime. On the other side, the US will have trouble preparing the proper logic to persuade Pyongyang when it insists that the missiles are for the sake of self-defense and a matter of sovereignty against outside military threat. Another problem is that there is neither basis in international law nor any existing mechanism to halt North Korea's missile development—it is a matter of security, not legality.

Pyongyang has been developing missiles including long-range ballistic missiles on the pretext of self-defense, and exporting them to earn money. To stop it the Clinton administration held talks with Pyongyang beginning in April 1996, pursuing a deal under which North Korea would abandon its long-range missile program in exchange for foreign assistance in launching satellites. Negotiations that had come close to putting a limit on the missile program were broken off at the end of Clinton's term.

The Bush administration was not satisfied with the Clinton policy, judging it an inappropriate approach supplying too many carrots in exchange for only a moratorium on missile test-firing. It was also said to be wrong for North Korea to set the pace, letting negotiations get all the way up to the secretary-of-state level without an agreement on details of verification procedures. From the Bush team's viewpoint, the previous
administration’s steps have not been a good precedent and they do not feel they can continue on the same track.

The Bush administration is also skeptical about Chairman Kim Jong-il, and to any possibility he might change. They recognize the North as a failing society with a despotic and ill-functioning regime, and seem to think that the US has not obtained meaningful gain in return for Pyongyang’s having received more than enough carrots.

The US administration has been setting about a review of overall North Korea policy. With an emphasis on a more specific approach to verify and monitor the North’s missile program, the administration wants the North to halt missile test-firing, export and development for the safety of its allies such as the ROK, Japan, and Israel, and intends to negotiate to fulfill that plan.

Perception and Phenomenon of North Korea’s WMDs and Missiles

US Perception on North Korea’s WMDs and Missile Threat

The presence of weapons of mass destruction and missiles in the region has increased dramatically the danger of miscalculation during a time of crisis, and the resulting regional instability magnifies the risk that these weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists.¹ There is the haunting perception that amidst this cornucopia brought through technological progress, nuclear, biological and other WMDs may either be or are likely soon to be in the hands of “rogue states” or even tiny groups of fanatics bent on destroying their imagined enemies.²

groups cannot obtain such weapons without the support of terrorist-sponsoring states, but the US has long dealt with North Korea as a rogue state that sponsors terrorism.

Immediately after the September 11 attacks the Bush administration implicated the DPRK in the new “war on terror,” owing to Pyongyang’s development of WMDs and weapons exports. In particular, the US is worried over the possibility of ballistic missile terrorism, according to senior sources at the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the US Air Force. They say the Nodong-1 ballistic missile system was designed as a weapon of terrorism rather than as an effective strategic strike system, citing its development program, lack of accuracy and lack of credible guidance system. There were accidents and misfirings in the testing of Scud-B and Scud-C missiles in the late 1990s.³

Repeatedly President Bush referred to North Korea alongside such distant states as erstwhile enemies Iran and Iraq as part of an “axis of evil” who sponsor terrorism and seek to acquire WMDs, by which, he said, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide the arms to terrorists giving them the means to match their hatred.⁴ The purpose was not to send a signal that military action was imminent, but rather to underscore the US commitment to the fight against terrorism, and to prevent their efforts from proliferating

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4 State of the Union Address, January 20, 2002. As for Bush’s remarks, a chorus of European leaders indicated that they would oppose military action against the states, as the split between Europe and Washington widened further. Jack Straw, the foreign secretary EU responded with fury to a comment that the axis of evil speech was more of a vote-winning tactic in forthcoming US elections than a military strategy. Continually, Berlin’s deputy foreign minister, Ludger Vollmer, added: “We Europeans warn against it. There is no indication, no proof that Iraq is involved in the terrorism. . . . This terror argument cannot be used to legitimise old enmities.” Guardian, February 5, 2002. Both China and Russia retaining close ties to Iraq, Iran and North Korea also presented it has no proof that those nations support terrorism. New York Times, February 4, 2002. Continually, China suggested the United States was preparing the ground for widening its war on terrorism. New York Times, February 3, 2002.
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and missiles. It is also represented that the US aim is prevention, not merely punishment.

The US has clear and compelling security concerns on the Korean peninsula, from stopping terrorism and protecting democratic allies to ending weapons proliferation. At the same time, it considers the perpetuation of civil war and limited international warfare as a serious threat to its own security. The DPRK's proliferating missiles and WMDs together with powerful conventional weapons also menace American allies South Korea and Japan, as well as the US forces on the peninsula.

**Actual Phenomenon of Spread of DPRK WMDs and Missiles**

North Korea sees the pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles as its path to national security and survival, and has stepped up its weapons acquisition and development, including unconventional weapons. This means increased threat against American democratic allies. Unconventional weapons are a relatively inexpensive means of maintaining deterrence against perceived enemies including the United States, Japan, and South Korea. These nations regard the WMDs and missiles of North Korea as a formidable threat to the security of Northeast Asia, and the US is trying to reduce their proliferation.

On the other side, North Korea has tried to obtain technology from around the world that could have applications in its nuclear program. It is estimated that they have enough plutonium to make several nuclear weapons. The North’s secret development of nuclear weapons could be the beginning of a nuclear domino phenomenon confronting the US in Northeast Asia.

As suggested by “action-reaction process models,” South Korea and

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7 For detailed explanation on action-reaction, see Richard W. Chadwick,
Japan might accelerate nuclear development with a view to defending themselves against a North Korean nuclear attack. In particular, Japan could become a very strong country with nuclear weapons, even developing a second-strike capability. Both China and Russia in reaction could enlarge their nuclear military power to balance Japan. Ultimately all the countries in Northeast Asia might end up living under nuclear terror, despite themselves possessing the deterrent potential of nuclear weapons.

Moreover, North Korea is carrying out a dedicated endeavor to accomplish chemical and biological capability, and has undergone development and production. They may have already weaponized. North Korea's domestic chemical industry can produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents including differently filled munitions systems. These weapons could be used with a variety of delivery vehicles, including ballistic missiles, aircraft, artillery projectiles and unconventional weapons.8

Pyongyang did accede to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),9 but has pursued biological warfare capabilities over the last four decades. It is known that the North has such biological agents as plague, diphtheria, cholera, anthrax, typhus, hemorrhagic fever, botulism, and the like. Its resources include a rudimentary (by Western standards) biotechnology infrastructure sufficient to support the production of limited quantities of toxins, as well as viral and bacterial biological warfare agents.10 It is believed to possess a munitions production infrastructure that would allow it to weaponize agents, and may have biological weapons available for military deployment.11

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9 North Korea entered into the BWC, but has not yet entered into the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Faced with plausible terrorist, in particular, anthrax attack the US seriously worries that compared to nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons are easier to acquire. Also, the inherently dual-use nature of many goods and technologies needed to produce chemical and biological weapons makes them all the easier to assemble.\textsuperscript{12} The interest in CB weapons on the part of terrorist groups and sponsoring nations as well as rogue entities has been growing, and may increase in the near term. Nevertheless, the US is seriously faced with potential North Korean chemical or biological weapons attack. Consider: if North Korea attacked the South with nuclear weapons the US could respond in kind. If an attack were made with chemical or biological weapons, however, it would be very difficult for the US to reply with nuclear weapons—yet neither could it reply with CB weapons.

In addition, it is pointed out that North Korea possesses numerous Scud missiles and continues to export missiles to antagonistic countries, which will be depicted in the following section. To the United States, with the proliferation of ballistic missiles in rogue states such as North Korea, the likelihood that terrorists and despots will use these WMDs to attack American territory has grown substantially.\textsuperscript{13}

North Korea's Missile Program

\textit{Missile Development and Test-firing}

Pyongyang claims its missile development is its sovereign right for peace and self-defense against a possible US invasion,\textsuperscript{14} but its short-

\textsuperscript{11} Statement by Ford, March 19, 2002.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Baker Spring, "Taking Points: Terrorist Attack on America Confirms the Growing Need for Missile Defense, Backgrounder, No. 1477 (September 20, 2001), p. 1.
\textsuperscript{14} Rodong Sinmun, August 2, 2001. Concerning this, Former Secretary of defense William Perry in interview on the News Hour, Public Broadcasting System, September 17, 1999 said, "While they have many reasons for wanting this missile program, their primary reason is security, is deterrence. Whom would they be deterring? They would be deterring the United States. We do not think of ourselves as a threat to North Korea, but I fully believe that they consider us a threat.
and medium-range missiles do pose a serious and growing threat to South Koreans as well as the US forces and their families in Korea. Another North Korean long-range missile launch would not only jeopardize regional security, but prompt widespread international condemnation and do grave harm to US-DPRK relations.\textsuperscript{15} Paul Wolfowitz, US deputy secretary of defense, with an intelligence viewpoint estimates that if there were a war in Korea tomorrow, North Korean missiles would wreak havoc on population centers and US deployed forces in South Korea, even if armed only with conventional weapons—and they now pose a significant threat to Japan as well.\textsuperscript{16}

As is well known, North Korea has developed missiles on the pretext of constant threats from the US who it says is equipped with enormous amounts of nuclear missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Thus, it says, it has the legitimate right of self-defense to develop, test-fire, and produce missiles of its own.

North Korea possesses large numbers of Scud-B missiles (with a range of 320–340 km), Scud-C (500 km), and Scud-D called Nodong-1 (up to 1,300 km). Further, it has test-fired the Taepodong-1 (2,500–4,000 km), and is developing the Taepodong-2 (up to 6,000 km). The DPRK is also developing and producing cruise missiles, including an extended-range version of the C-801 anti-ship missile.\textsuperscript{17}

It is known that North Korea has 400–500 Scud-B missiles the technology for which could have been acquired through collaboration with China, Iran and Egypt in the early 1980s. With financing from Iran, North Korea extended the payload and range of the type, producing a very much enhanced model powered by multiple engines—designated the Nodong—which was test flown in May 1993.\textsuperscript{18} This missile can bring all of Japan and much of North and East China within its range, and the DPRK has already deployed 100 missiles that could be targeted at Japan to them.

and the US forces in Japan. Besides, there is ample evidence that North Korea has created a sizable missile production infrastructure, and therefore it is highly likely that considerably more Scud-D missiles have been produced.\textsuperscript{19} The Scud-D could not only range over the entire Korean peninsula but strike far beyond as well.

As a step towards developing an intercontinental ballistic missile, North Korea launched a three-stage missile, the Taepodong-1, on August 31, 1998, without any prior notification or warning, in an effort to put a satellite into orbit. Although that goal failed, it did reveal Pyongyang’s capability to pursue a much more advanced ballistic missile program, which, land-based, would be able to carry a nuclear or a large chemical biological warhead. A Taepodong-1 space-launch vehicle (SLV) would have an operable third stage and a reentry vehicle capable of surviving ICBM flight. Converted to military use, it could deliver a light payload (sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon) to the United States, albeit with inaccuracies that would make hitting urban targets improbable.\textsuperscript{20}

In particular, Japan was very shocked with North Korea’s missile test-firing because it flew over the East Sea (Sea of Japan) and into the western part of the North Pacific Ocean, both of which contain major trade routes and important fishing grounds. It produced a credible ballistic missile threat against Japan and South Korea and, further, could be capable of threatening any US city with a nuclear warhead. Eventually, this event did help justify more discussion of a missile defense system in the US.

For further process, the North is much more likely to weaponize the larger two-stage Taepodong-2 missile than the Taepodong-1 as an ICBM to be sufficient for early-generation nuclear weapons. This missile could deliver a several-hundred-kilogram payload to Alaska or Hawaii. Lightweight variations of the Taepodong-2 could fly as far as 10,000 km, placing at risk western US territory in an arc extending from Phoenix,


Arizona, to Madison, Wisconsin.\textsuperscript{21} for Americans it is indeed frightening to think of such capability falling into the hands of terrorists.\textsuperscript{22} It would also present the fact that North Korea’s long-range missile menace had transferred from the hypothetical to the real.

From another angle, it is questionable if North Korea can equip ICBMs with weapons of mass destruction. Due to a variety of atmospheric and topographical factors, chemical warheads are not suitable to pose a large-scale threat to American cities.\textsuperscript{23} In addition, ballistic missiles might not be an effective delivery method for biological weapons. On long-range ballistic missiles such as ICBMs the agent must be well-insulated against the heat of atmospheric reentry. Effective dispersal would also be difficult due to high reentry velocities.\textsuperscript{24} That said, an ICBM would give North Korea a potent diplomatic card, which it could employ to raise tensions aimed at pressuring the United States at the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{25} From various viewpoints regarding its future ICBM capability, it is safe to say that North Korea will continue to attempt to develop an ICBM that can reach anywhere in the US.

As a result of US-DPRK discussions to curb the testing of long-range missiles, North Korea declared a moratorium on missile testing in September 1999 so long as dialogue would continue with the United States. The moratorium was regarded at that time as a first step toward a comprehensive ban. Once again, soon after President Bush’s statement on national missile defense, Chairman Kim Jong-il announced an extension of the moratorium on missile tests until at least 2003. This shows that hardheaded engagement backed by strong military deterrence has advanced vital US national interests on the Korean peninsula;\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{21} “The Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat.”
Chairman Kim seems to have made a big concession to prove his sincerity to the Bush administration, and to permit a longer period for serious talks and negotiation with the US.

However, it could be taken as meaningful that he has not yet made a commitment to extend the moratorium beyond that time. It is also worth noting that North Korea could continue to develop its missile program without doing its own test-firing, through acquiring experimental information and test-firing results from some of the countries to which it sold missiles, parts and technology.

**Missile Exports**

North Korea has continued to sell its missile-related equipment, components, materials, technical expertise, and complete systems to several countries in the Middle East, South Asia and North Africa. The US was very surprised that Pyongyang continued to supply such hardware and technology to antagonistic Middle East countries since the Agreed Framework and even since the September terrorist attack. These missile sales are, in the long run, believed to threaten not merely US allies in the Middle East but also the United States itself, as they could be transferred to terrorist groups.

During the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, North Korea supplied Iran with as much military equipment including missiles as Teheran could pay for and has continued aggressively to market its missiles, equipment and technology to places such as Iran and Pakistan where they have the potential to alter geopolitical and military calculations in important ways throughout the Middle East and South Asia.

Examples of such cooperation among these countries include the

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27 It is persistently reported that “North Korea’s sales of missiles and missile technology bring in upwards of $500 million annually appear to hark back to several years in the 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq war resulted in high demand for Scuds.” David C. Wright, “The Case for Engaging North Korea,” published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1999, available at www.uscusa.org/security/NKcase.html.
DPRK sale of milling and drilling equipment to Pakistan, cooperative covert programs to acquire nuclear and missile technologies from Germany, Pakistani provision of nuclear technology to the DPRK, etc.²⁹ Pakistan’s 600-mile-range Ghauri missile, launched in April 1998, was developed with North Korean technological assistance and missile parts. The DPRK may be assisting in developing its own transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) or mobile erector launchers.³⁰ The DPRK-Pakistan cooperation regarding missile components and technologies continued beyond the Ghauri program and contain numerous other missile, nuclear and defense-related fields.

As another example, Iran’s 900-mile-range Shahab-3 missile, tested on July 21, 1998, also used the same technology as North Korea’s Nodong missiles. Technology from the Taepodong-1 could have helped build the 1,200-mile-range Shahab-4 of Iran and Pakistan’s Ghazvnavi missile.³¹ They could reach as far as Israel or Central Europe.

The sales of missiles and technology has not been motivated by ideology. But it has provided a significant source of hard currency, and permitted other countries to obtain longer-range systems. Continually, the DPRK has accelerated the pace at which other countries obtain potential delivery systems for WMDs.

To be sure, North Korea’s missile sales aim at generating revenue, estimated at around one billion dollars annually.³² Its deteriorated economy motivates Pyongyang to sell missile parts and technology to other states or subnational groups in exchange for food and energy resources. For such reason, the North cannot afford to halt selling missiles to other countries, as it is a major part of their trade. Thus, to Chairman Kim Jong-il, if he “finds people who want to buy it, he will sell

³⁰ Ibid.
³² Radio Free Asia, May 28, 1999, cited by the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S. For on thing, it would be noted that the market prospects are bleak: the international demand for missiles has shrunk; client nations of missiles are focusing on their own missile production after missile technology has been transferred to them along with missiles; and Middle East clients don’t need long-range missile to hit targets in Israel. Korea Times, April 1, 1999.
From another angle, the CIA believes that money earned from the sale of missile technology and parts is being used to further Pyongyang's efforts to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

Controversially, North Korea explains that as the US has pursued economic isolation of the DPRK for more than half a century, their sources of foreign exchange have been circumscribed. They demand that the US release economic sanctions and requests compensation. The commentary essentially laid out an opening negotiation position (however unrealistic from a US government perspective) over the price it would demand to give up its missile exports as well as missile development, and invited the United States to respond at the negotiating table.

However, the Bush administration has intention neither to lift more sanctions without a firm belief in North Korea's efforts to stop proliferating WMDs and missiles, nor to provide cash compensation in exchange. Since the September terror attack the administration has continued strongly to warn Pyongyang to halt missile export and development, worrying that this equipment and technology could fall into terrorist hands.

**US-DPRK Negotiation and Strategy**

**Objectives and Process on Missile Negotiation**

The major US objectives are to halt the missile proliferation and, if possible, to induce Pyongyang to forgo missile development altogether.

When the Agreed Framework was reached, the US informed North Korea that in order to improve relations they had to settle the missile problems first. At the outset, however, the agreement was not designed to deal with the missile program and was not suitable to be used to

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fashion a mechanism to restrict production of long-range missiles and
missile exports. Nevertheless, it was helpful in opening a dialogue
channel in which those subjects could be discussed.

On the contrary, North Korea has no intention to comply with these
US demands, but will likely deal with the US only for the sake of gaining
food support and life necessities, easing of economic sanctions, release
from the list of terror-supporting nations, etc.

Furthermore, Pyongyang hopes for an end to the 50-year enmity
between US and DPRK and an end of the embargo, seeking something
like the 1972 Shanghai communique between the United States and
China, which set relations with Washington on a new course.\footnote{Leon V. Sigal, “Negotiating an End To North Korea’s Missile-Making,” Arms
Control Today (June 2000), p. 6.}

The first round of US-DPRK missile talks on April 20–21, 1996, dealt
mainly with missile nonproliferation and related issues. The US team
requested North Korea to halt missile exports and enter the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which prohibits the transfer of
missile-related technology and equipment. The Clinton administration
was more focused on stopping missile sales than production, offering
further easing of economic sanctions and removal of Pyongyang
from the terrorism list. The offer was refused for reasons of national
sovereignty.

In the second round on June 11–13, 1997, the US lodged a strong
protest with North Korea against Nodong missile development and
deployment to hit targets at major military bases in South Korea, and
called upon Pyongyang to halt missile development and join the MTCR.
The request was turned down and negotiations ceased.

In the third round of missile negotiations on October 1, 1998, which
came after the Taepodong test launch, the North Korea team offered to
halt missile exports if the US would pay one billion dollars a year for
three years. The Americans resolutely rejected that, instead offering
expanded economic activities resulting from lifting of major economic
sanctions. That was rejected on the ground of that easing of sanctions
had already been outlined in the Agreed Framework. Pyongyang made
the same proposal in the fifth-round talks on July 12, 2000, but the US
continued its strong position that cash compensation would be out of
question.

Negotiations continued between the US and DPRK for gaining access to a suspect nuclear site at Kumchang-ri, including the issue of halting missile test-firing. Pyongyang did allow access to the underground site, and in further talks declared the missile moratorium. In return, the Clinton administration took the meaningful step of removing a set of economic sanctions toward North Korea. The US tried to get North Korea to halt its weapons programs through offering extra carrots, but the effort failed because Pyongyang demanded too much. Further lifting of sanctions, in the US interpretation, would be connected to stopping the missile program and solving the terrorism issue, IAEA nuclear inspections, etc.

In the meantime, Chairman Kim Jong-il advanced the scheme of giving up missile launches in exchange for money and help from the West in launching satellites; the idea was advanced to President Vladimir Putin of Russia, but Chairman Kim later said he had been joking. Despite being surprised at that, the Clinton administration tried to find a solution—rightfully in opposition to Pyongyang’s scheme in relation to launch satellites through other countries, because space launch vehicles are practically identical to long-range missiles.

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also sought a deal under which the North would give up its long-range missile program in exchange for foreign assistance in launching North Korean satellites. Under the proposals left on the table at the end of the Clinton administration, the North would prohibit all exports of medium- and long-range missiles and related technologies in exchange for assistance in categories such as food, and ban further indigenous missile testing and production beyond a certain range in exchange for compensation and assistance with launching civilian satellites.38

Negotiations stalled over four issues: North Korea’s refusal to include short-range Scud missiles in the commitment to cease the development and deployment; North Korea’s non-response to the US position that it would have to agree to dismantle its already deployed Nodong

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missiles, the details of US verification of a missile agreement, and the nature and size of a US compensation package. Finally, however, the negotiators ran out of time discussing numbers of satellite launches and related costs.

Negotiations have not yet started under the Bush administration and lie stranded. Responding to President Bush’s “axis of evil” remark, the Korean Central News Agency said it was extremely reckless and that Bush was pursuing a hostile policy to stifle North Korea. In fact, his warning did prevent the reopening of dialogue. A naval firefight on June 29, 2002, started by the North Korean navy in the Yellow Sea has also exerted a negative influence on US-DPRK dialogue and brought forward once again Pyongyang’s bellicose image.

Even though the US insists upon nonproliferation of WMDs and missiles and cancelled a US envoy’s visit to Pyongyang on July 10, 2002, in response to the naval clash, its policy has not changed that it will hold talks with the DPRK unconditionally at any time, any place, seeking a road map for reciprocal steps, a plan for eventual elimination of North Korea’s WMDs and missiles.

**US Policy and Strategy on North Korea’s Missile Program**

Under “American internationalism” in which there is no inclination whatsoever to withdraw from the world into a fortress of protectionism or an island of isolation, the primary US emphasis in efforts to curb proliferation will remain twofold: to constrict the supply of nuclear materials and the means to deliver them, and to discourage other countries from believing any gains will accrue from possession of such weapons.

The US believes deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation, so President Bush called for “new concepts of deterrence.” It depends on both offensive and defensive forces, and

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requires a comprehensive strategy for curbing the proliferation of WMDs and ballistic missile technology. Such a strategy requires:

1. Maintaining and improving core alliance relations, and reassuring friends that we are committed to ensuring a stable international order and that our security interests are inseparable from their own;
2. Resolving challenges, rather than postponing them in a way that delays but makes even more dangerous the threats we will face in the future;
3. Recasting our foreign policy to better integrate all sources of influence available to us; and
4. Dissuading adversaries from undertaking hostile courses of action while persuading them that the US is not asking them to relinquish the capability to defeat aggression.\(^4^2\)

In order to facilitate such a strategy and prepare for the contingency of proliferation of WMDs and missiles, the US also calls for requiring urgent action on the following components:

1. All states should elevate security against WMDs and missile-proliferation to an overarching imperative that trumps other, secondary consideration.
2. Suppliers of WMDs- and missile-related technology should end such cooperation now. Security against WMDs and ballistic missile attacks is a first-order imperative on which there should be no compromise.
3. All states should strengthen nonproliferation regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
4. Nations should immediately secure their WMDs and missiles to the highest possible extent and help other states that lack the resources to do likewise.
5. Similarly, states should immediately increase the effectiveness of their export control systems and assist other states to the same end.\(^4^3\)

With such an emphasis on all states’ urgent action for security, the


\(^{43}\) Wolf, “U.S. Approaches to Nonproliferation,” p. 10.
US has several elements in its strategy in search of a way to nonproliferation and to eliminate North Korea’s military threat: to maintain close coordination with allies; to progress policy, whether engagement or hawk engagement, soft-line or hard-line with strong deterrence; to deal with North Korea’s WMDs and to strive towards nonproliferation; and to continue its efforts for dialogue and negotiation with DPRK.

The US, in recognition of being confronted with a missile attack from a broken regime or another small, hostile state, points out that new threats refer to such nations as North Korea and Iraq. As a way of coping with new threats, President Bush committed the United States to building a missile defense system.

Yet, this is still a dangerous world, a less certain, a less predictable one. More nations have nuclear weapons and still more have nuclear aspirations. Many have chemical and biological weapons. Some already have developed the ballistic missile technology that would allow them to deliver weapons of mass destruction at long distances and at incredible speeds. And a number of these countries are spreading these technologies around the world.

Unlike the Cold War, today’s most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in the Soviet hands, but from a small number of missiles in the hands of the states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life.44

North Korea emphasizes that the US with its world dominance in missiles is trying to establish a missile defense system under the pretext of defending against North Korean missiles, but in reality is trying to counter the challenge to US supremacy by other powerful countries and the EU.45

It also assumes that the purpose of MD is to target Pyongyang rather than to serve as response to its own ballistic missile proliferation. The overt North Korean response to US MD development efforts has come primarily in the form of vitriolic media attacks against US characterizations of North Korea’s own missile development efforts as the primary driver for pursuing MD.46

44 Remarks by the President to Students and Faculty at National Defense University, May 1, 2001.
45 Rodong Sinmun, August 2, 2001.
American MD efforts have been catalyzed by a North Korean and Iraqi missile threat, and yet Pyongyang continues to provoke, working towards the development of long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. It should not be surprising that in such a context, and absent a greater basis for cooperation to overcome half a century of mistrust, these missile development efforts together with MD could well be the sparks that put the United States and North Korea back on a course toward rhetorical collision if not military confrontation.47

As another approach, the Bush administration will continue to claim a broad agenda such as improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities, verifiable control over North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports, and a less threatening conventional military posture. It also gives emphasis on transparency, monitoring, and verification in connection with the above agenda items, and demands reciprocity in return for compromises with the DPRK. These are things that had been neglected under the Clinton administration, and imply that Bush will be much harder on provisions for monitoring and verification of any nonproliferation deal reached with Pyongyang.

For further process to cope with North Korea's proliferation of WMDs and military threat, the Bush administration is "firm in goals but flexible in tactics"48 with the new strategic framework that is composed of several elements, including nonproliferation and counter-proliferation. US Secretary of State Colin Powell added that with the new framework we are trying to put together, we would reduce the number of such strategic offensive weapons, and at the same time build defensive weapons that could defend us against those very irresponsible nations who are pursuing weapons of mass destruction and the missiles on which to mount them.49

In pursuit of the new strategic framework, the American non-

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46 Snyder, "Pyongyang's Pressure," p. 163.
48 James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State Nominee for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Confirmation Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, April 26, 2001, hereafter abbreviated as Kelly's Confirmation.
proliferation policy would focus on first curbing WMDs technology transfer, and consider diplomatic approaches and solutions with a variety of means of food and economic assistance, easing economic sanctions, developing relations, and so on. Differently from this, the counter-proliferation policy is considering the use of military force if nonproliferation and deterrence fail.

What the US wants, in the long run, is Pyongyang to enter the MTCR, which prohibits the transfer of missile-related technology and equipment. Until achieving this the Bush administration will endeavor to halt the missile sales, first and foremost, because the US recognizes that these exports to such hostile countries as Iran and Iraq directly threaten the safety of its major ally Israel.

In negotiation, the Bush administration will not accept the idea of exchanging satellite launches for serious missile restraint, or for any type of compensation including access to space launch services or financial payments, which had been considered under the Clinton administration. Little progress was made on verification, however, as Kim insisted that the US had adequate means to monitor compliance through satellite and other technical means and did not welcome intrusive inspections.50

Considering North Korea’s missile moratorium until at least 2003, what can be guessed is that Pyongyang’s decision makers seem to want to earn enough time to negotiate with Washington. Whatever North Korea’s intention, the US will put the greatest emphasis on halting any more missile test-firing.

If Pyongyang responds in halting long-range test-firing and development, the sale of missiles, missile components, technology and training, including systems that have already been contracted to provide to other countries, the US will expand its efforts to help the North Korean people with non-monetary assistance such food, coal or other commodities, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.

However, if the North launches does any more missile test launches or exports, not only would the Bush administration put a wide range of activities in jeopardy including humanitarian food, medical, economic and agricultural assistance, but it also could have very serious negative

consequences for US-DPRK relations. The US could even attack North Korean ships delivering missiles or missile parts, and carrying out not only economic sanctions but a containment policy against Pyongyang.

Conclusion

In the meantime, the Bush administration has been reviewing policy toward North Korea with the idea of taking an even harder line based on previous long-range missile development and test-firing, and missile sales to hostile countries. More recently, having alternatives in mind, the administration decided to resume talks on missiles, missile technology, missile sales, nuclear weapons programs, conventional forces, and humanitarian issues. The administration took this direction without any consideration of preconditions in talks with the DPRK.

The direction of the dialogue with North Korea is a comprehensive approach. It means that the US will concentrate on resolving the whole missile issue and not plan to hold separate talks on various agenda items.

North Korea is willing to consider limits on its missile program in return for cash compensation. As always, Pyongyang will demand improved relations with the US. Washington will not be willing to pay cash compensation, and emphasize restraint upon the missile program first, improvement of relations later.

Much difficulty is expected in negotiations. North Korea will not easily give up its missile program, which is absolutely necessary for obtaining the hard currency that works as a means of maintaining the socialist regime, as well as increasing its military. On the other side, the US will have a hard time coming up with the proper logic to persuade North Korea, when the latter insists that its missile program is for self-defense and a matter of sovereignty against military threat from outside. The problem can also be viewed based on the fact that there is no basis in international law nor any existing mechanism to bar North Korea’s missile development. In short, it is a matter of security, not legality.

The US policy, including assistance toward North Korea, will be in difficulty if the North continues testing new missiles and making long-range missiles. To counter US action against the missile threat, the North Korean regime may well adopt a brinkmanship strategy with some
military means. If that happens, prevention of war on the Korean peninsula cannot be guaranteed. US wishes and national interests are best promoted through maintaining a status quo on the peninsula and a balance of power in the Northeast Asia. Brinkmanship strategy on the part of either Washington or Pyongyang will make it difficult for the US to fulfill its role as a power balancer, power stabilizer, honest broker, and controller.

Both sides should continue the talks with patience. A comprehensive package deal approach is suggested: North Korea should accept IAEA inspections, keep the MTCR, reduce its conventional forces, and abandon its threat to South Korea. In responding to the North, the US would supply a huge quantity of food, remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of international terrorism, ease economic sanctions fully, supply electricity, build electrical grids to handle the electricity from the light-water reactor, help North Korea gain loans from international financial institutions, guarantee North Korea's safety with a promise of giving up any containment offensive, and develop relations and further establishment of the norm.

If not possible to accomplish such a comprehensive package deal some time or other, as a first-stage alternative: the North could give up development of long-range missile, stop exporting missiles, and withdrawing current missile deployment rearward; in return, the US would remove the DPRK from the terrorism list and and easing sanctions, while any North Korean satellites would be launched by a third country.