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Bilateral Cooperation and Hedging in the Six-Party Talks 상세보기 화면
제목 Bilateral Cooperation and Hedging in the Six-Party Talks
저자 Andrei Golobokov
Year 2022
Date September
문서보기
영문 키워드 Six-Party Talks, nuclear non-proliferation, South Korea, United States, security, Korean Peninsula
DOI https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2022.34.3.006
공유하기

The relations between great and middle powers in the Six?Party Talks are a particularly pertinent case in which to discuss the success and failure of multilateral security institutions. Why was this series of negotiations successful at first, followed by a stalemate, and then collapsed after two decades? There are many studies that focus on the behavior of North Korea, China, and the United States from a power perspective. This paper argues that a high degree of cooperation at the bilateral level among the majority of participants is a determining factor for the success of the talks. Strong reciprocal engagements, which are called “thick reinforcements,” resulted in solid unity among participating states and decisive collective action. The research finds different effects caused by combinations of thick reinforcement and weak engagement across dyads. While a strong “contagion effect” contributed to the success of the talks, the occurrence of hedging generated “offsetting” and “neutralization” effects, which stagnated the discussions. This paper develops a new metric to measure the various combinations of bilateral relations among China, South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States. The paper finds that in addition to non-proliferation, bilateral engagement and unity are vital for resolving nuclear crises.

"공공누리 제2유형 : 출처표시+상업적 이용금지"본 저작물은 "공공누리 제2유형 : 출처표시+상업적 이용금지" 조건에 따라 이용할 수 있습니다.