제목
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Disillusioning Pyongyang’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy: Nuclear Asymmetry, Conventional Posture, and Overdeterrence |
저자
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Jihwan Hwang
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Year
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2023
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Date
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December
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문서보기
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영문 키워드 |
North Korea, nuclear deterrence, nuclear asymmetry, conventional deterrence, overdeterrence, Pyongyang |
DOI |
https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2023.35.4.003 |
공유하기
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링크복사
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Does Kim Jong Un need nuclear weapons to deter the United States? Pyongyang
has long insisted that nuclear weapons prevent the United States from invading
North Korea. But, do nuclear weapons provide Pyongyang with as much deterrent
effect as it expects? Has the conventional military posture failed in deterring the
U.S.-ROK alliance? This article challenges conventional wisdom on North Korean
nuclear deterrence and raises the question of why nuclear weapons do not help
Pyongyang improve its deterrence capability. Pyongyang’s pursuit of nuclear
deterrence is an overdeterrence. Pyongyang’s presumably assured retaliation is not
credible given the United States’ superb nuclear capability. Rather, conventional
deterrence has worked on the Korean peninsula. Pyongyang may have other reasons
to build up its nuclear capability, but the risks and costs are too high to take. This
article also suggests highly important and timely theoretical and policy implications
about how to deal with a nuclear North Korea.
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